STATE OF SO	OUTH CAROLIN	NA)				
(Caption of Case)) BEFORE THE) PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION			
In the Matter	of:)) OF SOUTH CAROLINA			
Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC for Approval of Energy Efficiency Plan Including an Energy Efficiency Rider and Portfolio of Energy Efficiency Programs)			
(Please type or print Submitted by:	J. Blanding Ho	Jmon IV	SC Bar Number:	72260		
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Other:	Relief demanded in		URE OF ACTION		's Agenda expeditiously	
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☐ Electric		☐ Affidavit	Letter		Request	
☐ Electric/Gas		Agreement	☐ Memorandun	1	Request for Certification	
☐ Electric/Teleco ☐ Electric/Water	ommunications	Answer Appellate Review	☐ Motion ☐ Objection		Request for Investigation	
Electric/Water/	/Talacom	Application	Petition		Resale Agreement Resale Amendment	
Electric/Water/		Brief	<u> </u>	econsideration	Reservation Letter	
Gas	Bewei	Certificate	Petition for R		Response	
Railroad		Comments		le to Show Cause	Response to Discovery	
Sewer		☐ Complaint	Petition to Int	tervene	Return to Petition	
☐ Telecommunic	ations	Consent Order	Petition to Inte	rvene Out of Time	☐ Stipulation	
☐ Transportation		Discovery	Prefiled Testi	mony	Subpoena	
Water		Exhibit	Promotion		☐ Tariff	
☐ Water/Sewer		Expedited Consideration	Proposed Ord	ler	Other:	
Administrative	Matter	Interconnection Agreement	Protest			
Other:		Interconnection Amendment	nt Dublisher's A	ffidavit		
		☐ Late-Filed Exhibit	Report			

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 2007-358-E

In the Matter of:)	SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF
	`	DAVID NICHOLS ON BEHALF OF
Application of Duke Energy)	ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, THE
Carolinas, LLC for Approval of)	SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL
Energy Efficiency Plan Including an	`	CONSERVATION LEAGUE,
Energy Efficiency Rider and Portfolio)	SOUTHERN ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN
of Energy Efficiency Programs)	ENERGY AND THE SOUTHERN
)	ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER
)	

1	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, ADDRESS AND AFFILATION.
2	A.	My name is David Nichols. I am Senior Consultant with Synapse Energy
3		Economics, Inc., 22 Pearl Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139.
4	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS DOCKET?
5	A.	Yes, I provided direct testimony on behalf of Environmental Defense ("ED"), the
6		South Carolina Coastal Conservation League ("CCL"), the Southern Environmental Law
7		Center ("SELC"), and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy ("SACE").
8	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?
9	A.	My purpose is to reply to certain statements made in the pre-filed rebuttal
10		testimony of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC ("Duke" or the "Company") witnesses.
11	Q.	DO YOU AGREE WITH DUKE WITNESS ROGERS THAT SAVE-A-WATT IS
12		NOT A RADICAL PROPOSAL?
13	A.	No, I do not. In my direct testimony, I stated that the Save-A-Watt proposal
14		represents a radical departure from established principles of cost-based ratemaking. On
15		page 4 of his rebuttal testimony, Duke Witness Rogers states that Save-A-Watt is not
16		radical because it relies on "traditional PURPA avoided cost pricing.[.]"
17		I certainly agree that Save-A-Watt relies on PURPA avoided cost pricing.
18		However, the basis on which PURPA purchases are made differs from the basis on which
19		regulated electric utilities are paid for what they sell. PURPA rates apply only to
20		unregulated third parties. The Save-A-Watt proposal to turn around and make PURPA-
21		type payments back to the regulated utility is a completely unprecedented proposal.
22		Duke is asking ratepayers to compensate the Company as if it were an
23		unregulated third party. There is nothing traditional about this proposal. By contrast, my

1		position is that when rates are set for regulated utilities, they must be set on the
2		fundamental basis of actual incurred utility costs.
3		PURPA rates are based on estimates of long-term future supply costs. As a result,
4		there have been problems in the utility industry with long-term electricity purchase
5		contracts that utilities have signed with unregulated third parties based on PURPA rates. I
6		refer specifically to instances where the long-term avoided cost estimates reflected in
7		PURPA rates turned out to be much too high, and actual supply costs turned out to be
8		significantly lower than the estimated future costs that were the basis of the contracts.
9	Q.	DOES THE SAVE-A-WATT PLAN RUN THE SAME RISKS AS YOU HAVE
10		CITED WITH OTHER PURPA-TYPE CONTRACTS?
11	A.	Yes, it does. Under Save-A-Watt, payments to the utility would be locked in
12		based on avoided costs estimated for many years out into the future. If actual future
13		supply costs should prove lower than the stream of projected supply costs that would be
14		used for each year's vintage of Save-A-Watt programs, that would not reduce the PURPA
15		type payments back to Duke, for these will be at locked in high prices, and Duke's profits
16		could be even higher than the excessive levels I discussed in my direct testimony.
17	Q.	ON PAGE 10 OF HIS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY, MR. SHULTZ STATES THAT
18		ONLY INFORMATION ABOUT SAVE-A-WATT THAT DUKE CLAIMS
19		REQUIRES CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTION IS "AVOIDED COST
20		CALCULATIONS." IS THIS CORRECT?
21	A.	No, it is not. The Company has also held confidential the amounts and percentage
22		of revenues that would be collected for load management versus the revenues for energy
23		conservation. The Company has declined to disclose the amounts and percentages of

1		Save-A-Watt revenues that would be attributable to their actual programs costs, versus
2		net lost revenue recovery, versus additional profits from Save-A-Watt. Overall Company
3		earnings with and without Save-A-Watt are also "confidential." These basic metrics do
4		not require revelation of avoided costs. These and other confidential metrics would allow
5		interested members of the public to benchmark Duke's proposal against other proposals.
6		Furthermore, I note that basic data regarding the long-term revenue requirement
7		have been only partially disclosed. Mr. Stevie has provided the overall revenue charge for
8		energy conservation, but not the corresponding figure for load shifting which can be
9		translated into terms that would be understandable to a customer.
10	Q.	IN YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY, YOU STATED THAT YOU WERE NOT
11		AWARE OF ANY REGULATORY COMMISSION THAT PERMITS A UTILITY
12		TO EARN ADDITIONAL SHAREHOLDER REWARDS FOR LOAD
13		MANAGEMENT, ABOVE AND BEYOND RECOVERY OR PROGRAM COSTS.
14		DID YOU NOTE MR. SCHULTZ'S STATEMENT THAT DUKE RECEIVED
15		SOME REWARDS IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1992-1994, AND THAT REWARDS
16		ARE OFFERED IN NORTH CAROLINA, OHIO, AND KENTUCKY?
17	A.	Yes, I did. I am glad to learn of the instances he cites. First, I would note that
18		these instances appear to be traditional performance incentives, which provide a
19		supplement to cost recovery that is fundamentally grounded in actual incurred utility
20		costs. As such, these few cases radically differ from the Save-A-Watt scheme.
21		Further, the electric utility industry has over 30 years' experience with load
22		management, in virtually every state. The instances Mr. Schultz cites are exceptions to
23		the well-established general practice of regulatory commissions over the decades

1		throughout the country, to limit cost recovery for load management to actual incurred
2		program costs. From the viewpoint of regulatory principles, there is no reason to provide
3		additional shareholder rewards to utilities for load management, let alone Duke's
4		proposal for a reward that it projects would exceed program costs by well over a hundred
5		percent.
6	Q.	DR. CICCHETTI STATES ON PAGE 9 OF THIS REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
7		THAT WITH SAVE-A-WATT, REGULATED REVENUE REQUIREMENTS
8		WOULD BE LESS THAN WITH A WHOLLY GENERATION-BASED PLAN.
9		DO YOU AGREE?
10	A.	In my direct testimony, I explained that with conventional cost recovery
11		approaches, utilities pursue load management to meet service needs at lower cost than
12		meeting them through a capacity addition, so as to reduce the overall costs of electric
13		supply. In other words, long-run revenue requirements are reduced, just as they are when
14		the most economical generation plant is chosen over a more costly one. Of course, these
15		reductions do not begin until there is a base rate case to establish new rates that reflect the
16		cost savings.
17		In contrast, Save-A-Watt would not create this potential for reducing revenue
18		requirements. The potential to reduce revenue requirements is inherent in traditional,
19		cost-based load management, and is the very reason it has been pursued successfully
20		throughout the nation for decades.
21		What the Save-A-Watt PURPA-type scheme would do, however, is double the
22		cost of load management to ratepayers. Thus, if there were still any reduction to revenue
23		requirements with Save-A-Watt, it would have to be less than the reduction there would

1		be with utility cost recovery for load management treated as it traditionally has been in
2		this and other jurisdictions.
3		In fact, Duke has not presented any evidence that regulated revenue requirements
4		actually would be lower with Save-A-Watt than without it; there may well be no savings
5		at all. But if there were, they would have to be smaller than the tested alternative of
6		procuring demand-side resources on the basis of their actual costs to the utility.
7	Q.	MR. SHULTZ STATES THAT IT IS USEFUL FOR A UTILITY TO HAVE
8		BUDGET FLEXIBILITY IN DELIVERING ENERGY CONSERVATION
9		PROGRAMS. ON PAGE 15 OF HIS TESTIMONY, DR. CICCHETTI ALSO
10		ARGUES FOR FLEXIBILITY. BOTH WITNESSES SAY YOU ARE OPPOSED
11		TO FLEXBILITY IN DELIVERING DEMAND-SIDE PROGRAMS. PLEASE
12		COMMENT.
13	A.	As my testimony indicates, I support budget flexibility. However, the Save-A-
14		Watt PURPA-type payment scheme is not required to achieve flexibility. To the
15		contrary, in many other jurisdictions, regulators do provide a reasonable amount of
16		budget flexibility to comprehensive utility energy conservation programs, which helps to
17		increase the impact of the programs. In any reapplication to this Commission to conduct
18		energy conservation programs under a sound, cost-based approach, with supplementary
19		performance incentives, I would encourage the utility to also submit suggested provisions
20		for budget flexibility.
21		I oppose micromanagement and inflexibility. Flexibility cannot be unlimited, for
22		regular regulatory oversight is needed, in the form of periodic review of proposed
23		programs, initial budgets, and program performance. But flexibility can be substantial: in

1		their conservation market potential study for Duke, Duke Energy Carolinas DSM Action
2		Plan, the Company's consultants recommended several types of flexibility that are fully
3		consistent with an appropriately cost-based cost recovery framework for utility energy
4		conservation programs. Flexibility is also appropriate in conducting load management.
5	Q.	MR. SCHULTZ, ON PAGE 7 OF HIS PRE-FILED DIRECT TESTIMONY,
6		STATES THAT INCENTIVES BASED ON A PERCENTAGE OF UTILITY
7		COSTS ENCOURAGE SPENDING. DO YOU AGREE?
8	A.	Yes, I do. Of course, I do not advocate incentives based on a percentage of
9		spending. I advocate consideration of shareholder incentives based on performance, but
10		with some upper limit to protect ratepayers. One common upper limit is a percentage of
11		actual program costs, such as 10 percent. The upper limit is to prevent the total cost of
12		conservation to ratepayers, including any incentive, from deviating excessively from the
13		utility's actual incurred costs.
14		Because it is not linked to or limited by program costs in the way I have just
15		described, the Save-A-Watt program would deliver energy conservation at much too high
16		a ratepayer cost per KWh saved. In fact, on page 8 of his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Stevie
17		states that the overall revenue charge for energy conservation under Save-A-Watt is
18		projected by the Company to equal \$0.052/KWh saved. This is double the revenue
19		charge to deliver conservation experienced by several utilities with successful
20		conservation programs in other jurisdictions. There are several sources that document
21		this; for example, the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (Table 6-3) identifies
22		eleven programs with reported lifetime costs of 3 cents per kWh or less. Notably, the

reported avoided costs associated with those programs ranged from 3 to 7 cents per kWh,

23

1		suggesting that these programs are not succeeding due to having high energy costs. It is
2		the Save-A-Watt PURPA-type scheme which would directly and necessarily cause high-
3		cost conservation, not the industry's standard approach to conservation program cost
4		recovery.
5	Q.	DO WITNESSES SCHULTZ AND CINCCHETTI COMMENT ON EXHIBIT NO.
6		6 IN YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY, WHERE YOU COMPARE DUKE'S
7		PROJECTED ENERGY CONSERVATION ACHIEVEMENTS WITH THE
8		ACHIEVEMENTS OF A NUMBER OF INDUSTRY LEADERS?
9	A.	Yes, they do. That exhibit has a table highlighting several utilities that have
10		achieved annual energy savings impacts of at least one percent of sales, which I contrast
11		with Duke's maximum projected annual impact from Save-A-Watt (one-quarter of one
12		percent). I consider these data relevant because Duke's witnesses say they strive to be
13		national leaders in energy conservation, yet their plans fall below what actual national
14		leaders have done and are planning to do.
15		Mr. Schultz states that many utilities have achieved annual conservation program
16		impacts of 0.15 to one percent of annual sales. I agree. In fact, a large number of utilities
17		around the country have achieved impacts between Duke Energy's projected maximum
18		annual level of 0.25 percent and one percent. Although their achievements are also
19		relevant in assessing Duke's claim that it plans for national leadership, I simply did not
20		include them in the table.
21		Dr. Cicchetti adds to my table the fact that the utilities I list had shareholder
22		incentives for energy conservation performance. He is correct, except for the two
23		California utilities, where incentives were instituted after the year used in my table. Of

course, these are all supplemental performance incentives, added to cost recovery that is
based squarely and directly on the utility's incurred program costs; as such, they
fundamentally differ from Save-A-Watt. Dr. Cicchetti also notes that two of these
utilities (his footnote 2 shows it is three) benefited from either a revenue decoupling
arrangement or a lost margin adjustment.

Dr. Cicchetti seems to think the information he added to the table rebuts something in my direct testimony. It does not. I simply stated that each listed utility operates in jurisdictions where there are most or all of these key elements: regulatory requirements for conservation achievements; direct program cost recovery; a means of addressing revenue erosion, if needed; and utility performance incentives. Such proven approaches are, in fact, what we would advise Duke to assemble in a request from this Commission.

13 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

14 A. Yes, it does.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the following persons have been served with the Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC), Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE), the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League (CCL), and Environmental Defense (ED) surrebuttal testimony of David Nichols:

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This 28th day of January, 2008.

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